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The Editor advised (warned?) readers that the July number would be late, rendering partly false the statement above 'not August'. They will also note once more the absence of an instalment of Henderson. But this is not the whole of the July number, which will be continued in a second part entirely devoted to the completion of that work. In that, perhaps, the Editor may be able to discuss what he called 'some of the problems that face LCM' (really only lots of material and the changed economic climate in Universities - cryptic words that he will in due course explain).

For, but chiefly for the benefit of readers not resident in this country (both 'foreign' and 'abroad' seem these days slightly pejorative - 'overseas' might do), he now re-publishes the Research ratings of different departments of Classics that were contained in the May letters of the University Grants Committee. The exact basis of these ratings is not known, and has been questioned. They bear some relation to the reports forwarded to the UGC by Universities, in their turn based, it seems, on reports compiled by Deans of Faculties from reports submitted by Heads of Departments. It must also be noted that History fell under a different 'Cost Centre' (Humanities) from Classics (= Greek and Latin: Language-based Studies), but it is not clear whether Ancient History contributed to the rating of Classics in those Universities in which it is in a School of Classics. Nor is it clear the extent to which these ratings will be taken into account by Universities in making their plans or by the UGC in giving or withholding its necessary blessing to any of the various mergers which still seem to be under discussion and wraps. But here they are.

OUTSTANDING: Cambridge: Oxford: St.Andrews: King's & University Colleges, London.
ABOVE AVERAGE: Liverpool

AVERAGE: Birmingham: Exeter: Keele: Kent: Manchester: Newcastle: Nottingham: Reading: Southampton: Warwick: Edinburgh: Glasgow: Bangor: Cardiff: Swansea: Birkbeck College, London: Royal Holloway and Bedford New College.

The letter is causing Universities to concentrate into one year the savings they had anticipated making in four, at the same time as their administrative structure is being simplified in a way that will throw more financial responsibility on to 'cost centres' and their constituent departments, which are being encouraged to bring in to Universities as much outside money as they can. LCM is a private venture, but has always been very conscious of the ways in which it has benefitted from the support of the Department and the University. It could not have been run at a loss, and the Editor is beginning to feel that he should think of repaying some of his debts (moral not financial) to the institutions that have supported him. But more of this in the second part of this number.

98 G.B.A.FLETCHER(Newcastle): *On the Histories of Tacitus again.*

LCM 11.7(Jul.1986), 98-100

What follows is a small selection of notes, mainly suggested by H.Heubner's valuable commentary, supplementing *Annotations on Tacitus* (Brussels, 1964), 54-96; *Latomus* 28(1969), 42; (1971), 383-385; (1982), 647-653; *LCM* 8.6(Jun.1983), 95-96; *SFIC* ser.3 3(1985), 92-99.

Book 1.

- 5.1 *pronus ad nouas res*. H. says that this expression is found only here. It is in Suetonius, *Vit.*7.3 *pronus ... ad res nouas*.
- 7.1 *Macrum ... turbantem*. H. says that the only comparable passage is Cicero, *Sull.* 57 *si in Hispania turbatum esset*. Cf. Livy 5.17.5 *numquam desitum interim turbati*.
- 7.3 *seruorum manus subitis auidae*. H., like Spooner, Davies, Alford and Wolff, rightly understands *subitis* as 'unter dem Eindruck des unerwarteten Glückswechsels'. But Church and Brodribb translate 'caught with greedy hands at immediate gain', Moore follows them with 'clutched greedily after sudden gains', and in P.G.W.Glare's *Oxford Latin Dictionary* '*subitis auidae*' is supposed to be Latin for 'eager for a revolution'. Cf. for example, Seneca, *Ep.*88.22 *omnia subita, quia causas non nouere, mirantium*; Suetonius, *Aug.*84.1 *non deficeretur ad subita extemporali facultate*; Tacitus, *H.*1.69 *uulgi mutabile subitis*.
- 10.1 *attritis opibus, librico statu*. For the use of *status* H. cites Pliny, *Ep.*10.8.6, but not Cicero, *Att.*6.1.23.
- 31.2 *et necdum adulta seditio*. H. says that *necdum* with the meaning of *nondum* is not found in earlier prose. It is in Livy and in Seneca, *Contr. exc.*8.6.
- 32.1 *quippe ... postulaturis*. H. says that the use of *quippe* with a participle begins with Sallust and Livy. It is to be seen in Lucretius 3.190.
- 34.1 *iuuenis magno nomine*. Cf. Silius 14.267 *paruo nomine Tisse*.
- 43.1 *praetoriae cohortis*. H. says that the expression is not found earlier. It is in Pliny, *Nat.*5.20.
- 2 *nominatim in caedem eius ardentis*. H. says that *nominatim* is so used first in Pliny, *Nat.*19.150 *ouillo fimo nominatim uti*. Cf., for example, Cicero, *Att.*3.20.2 *tibi nihil mando nominatim*.
- 56.1 *non retinere dubios*. H. cites Seneca, *Ep.*95.46 *dubio et incerto*, and Lucan 9.581-582 *dubii semperque futuris | casibus ancipites*, but not Livy 24.39.9 *qui ante dubii erant defecere ad Poenos*, Frontinus, *Strat.*2 pr.11 *de dubiorum animis in fide retinendis*, Suetonius, *Jul.*4.2 *dubias ciuitates retinuit in fide*.
- 66.1 *uestigia prensando*. For *uestigia* in prose H. cites only the elder Pliny and Apuleius. Cf. Cicero, *Rep.*6.21; Livy 21.36.7.
- 72.3 *supremae necessitatis*. Cf. Sallust, *H.*1.55.15 *extremam necessitatem*; Seneca *D.*10.1.3 *ultima ... necessitate*.
- 75.1 *incertum an metu*. For this use of *incertum* meaning 'perhaps' H. cites outside Tacitus only a passage of Granius Licinianus. Cf. Suetonius, *Otho* 1.1 *matre humili incertum an ingenua*.
- 77.1 *pleraque ... properando*. H. says that the transitive use of *propero* is found first in Sallust. It is found in Plautus, *Poen.*505.
- 3 *auguratus ... cumulum dignitatis addidit*. H. cites passages in Valerius Maximus and Seneca, *Phaedr.*1119. Cf. rather Ovid, *Met.*11.205-206 *addit, | perfidiae cumulum, falsis periuria uerbis*.
- 80.1 *orta seditio*. H. quotes Livy 38.16.2 but not Cicero, *Sest.*77, or Sallust, *Jug.*6.3.
- 83.1 *ambitioso imperio*. H. quotes Valerius Maximus 2.7.2 *ambitioso imperatore* but not Cicero, *Mur.*20 *ambitiosus imperator*.

Book 2.

- 2.2 *laeva maris*. Cf. Ovid, *Tr.*4.10.97 *maris Euxini laeua*; Manilius 4.602 *laeva freti ... aequora*; Sallust, *H.*2.54 *laeva moenium*
- 6.2 *uirorum inopes*. For *inops* with a genitive of living creatures H. cites Seneca *animalium*, Curtius *equorum* and Claudian *pecudum* but not Cicero, *Amic.*53 *amicorum*; Vitruvius 6 pr.2 *amicorum*; Statius, *Theb.*4.604 *comitum*.
- 14.3 *obtulere se hosti*. H. quotes Accius, *trag.*427 and Livy 28.22.13, but not Caesar, *Gall.*4.12.6 *se hostibus obtulit*.

Book 2 continued

- 16.2 *occepit*. H. says that this verb is not found in verse after Lucretius. It is in Phaedrus, 3.16.7.
- 17.1 *longa pax ad omne servitium fregerat faciles occupantibus*. H. remarks that there is no other example of *frangere ad* with this meaning. Cf. Silius, 1.261-2 *sternacem ad proelia ... | frangere equum* and for *frangere* alone Cicero, *Fam.* 4.6.2 *cum frangerem iam ipse me cogereque illa ferre toleranter*.
- 29.1 *coercere ... coeptabat*. H. cites for an example in prose of *coepto* with an infinitive Cicero *Fin.* 5.24. There are others in Suetonius, *Otho* 11.1; Gellius 4.1.6., 15.2.3; and later.
- 42.2 *tum incubuit hostium acies*. Heraeus, Valmaggi and Goelzer quote Virgil, *Aen.* 9.73 *tum uero incumbunt*. H. quotes Silius 5.218-219. Cf. also Virgil, *Aen.* 9.791 *Teucri clamore incumbere magno*
- 2 *non una pugnae facies*. H. quotes Columella 10.381 *una neque est illis facies* but not Virgil, *G.* 2.85 *nec pingues unam in faciem nascuntur oliuae*.
- 49.1 *uacavit abeuntium adloquitis*. For this use of *uaco* H. quotes Curtius, Seneca and Suetonius, but not Cicero, *diu.* 1.11 *philosophiae ... uaco*, or Velleius, Quintilian and the younger Pliny.
- 65.1 *laetitiam ... uultu ferens*. Cf. Cicero, *Att.* 14.13.2 *laetitiam ... apertissime tulimus omnes*; Octavia 705 *ore laetitiam gerens*.
- 69.1 *pietatem militum*. H. quotes Lucan 4.499 *militiae pietas*. Cf. Cicero, *Phil.* 14.6 *summa militum pietas*.
- 81.3 *speciem fortunae principalis effecerat*. H. says that the expression *speciem efficere* does not occur elsewhere. Cf. Sallust, *H.* 1.30 *speciem captae urbis efficere*, 3.63 *speciem effecit Scythici arcus*; Cassius Parmensis, Cicero, *Fam.* 12.13.4 *speciem exercitus effecit*; *B.Afr.* 37.4 *iugum ... uelut theatri effecit speciem*; Ammianus Marcellinus 22.8.20, 23.4.8.
- 84.2 *largus priuatim quo audius de re publica sumeret*. For *priuatim* modifying an adjective cf. Livy 5.8.9 *priuatim Sergio inuisus infestusque*. H. says that he does not know another example of *sumere de*. Apart from examples of *supplicium de aliquo sumere* cf. Cicero, *Orat.* 163 and *Dom.* 138 *sumpta de medio*; Aratus 346 *certas ipse notas caeli de tegmine sumens*; Horace, *A.P.* 243 *de medio sumptis*; Ovid, *Pont.* 3.5.20 *de caelata sumere lance inuat*; Vitruvius 4.8.5; Pliny, *Ep.* 9.40.2 *multum ... de nocte ... sumitur*; Calpurnius Flaccus 44 *nemo de polluto grege hostium sumit*.
- 88.3 *ad iurgium, mox ad manus et ferrum transirent*. H. says that there is no exact parallel for *transire* before Tacitus. Cf. perhaps Celsus 3.16.2 *a uino ad aquam, ab aqua ad uinum, a leuibus cibis ad acres, ab acribus ad leues transire*; Pliny, *Ep.* 7.4.7 *transii ad elegos*.
- 101.2 *lubrica ad mutandam fidem classe*. For the use of *lubrica* cf. Silius 5.18 *flore capi iuuenem primaueo lubrica mentem*. H. says that *lubricus* with *ad* is found only here. It is in Ambrose, *Ep.* 66.2 and *De Interpell.* *Iob et David* 1.7.21, Ambrosiaster, *In Gal.* 3.25, Isidore, *Sent.* 3.32.9.

Book 3

- 5.1 *penes quos ciuitatis regimen*. Cf. Livy 3.33.7 *regimen totius magistratus penes Appium*.
- 10.3 *ira militum in Tarpium Flauianum incubuit, nullo criminis argumento, sed iam pridem inuisus turbine quodam ad exitium poscebatur: propinquum Vitellii, proditorem Othonis, interceptorem donatiui clamitabant. nec defensionis locus, quamquam supplices manus teneret, humi plerumque stratus, lacera ueste, pectus atque ora singultu quatiens. id ipsum apud infensos incitamentum erat tamquam nimis paupor conscientiam argueret. obturbabatur militum uocibus Aponius cum loqui coeptaret; fremitu et clamore ceteros aspernabantur*.
These sentences begin with a reference to emotion in *ira*. They contain three references to shouting by the soldiers in *clamitabant*, *obturbabatur* and *fremitu et clamore*. What is the meaning of *turbine quodam*? Wellesley translates 'on a sudden and violent gust of passion'. He compares Valerius Flaccus 6.279-280 *magnoque doloris | turbine* and could have quoted also Ovid, *Am.* 2.9.28 *nescio quo miserae turbine mentis agor*. H. quotes Florus 3.21.18 *tertius ille turbo civilis insaniae toto furore detonuit*. The emotion of the soldiers has been mentioned already in *ira*. Does not *turbine quodam ad exitium poscebatur* mean 'with a storm of shouting they kept demanding his death', whereby each

100 Book 3 continued

of the four sentences concerning the action of the soldiers has a reference to shouting? For *turbo* applied to language cf. Silius 11.579-580 *spumanti turbine perflas | ignorantum aures* and 16.319 *tollitur in caelum furiali turbine clamor*.

lacera ueste. H. says that this expression seems to be found only here. It is in Statius, *Theb.* 5.254 *laceras ... uestes*.

fremitu et clamore ceteros aspernantur. H. compares Cicero, *Att.* 2.19.3 *magno cum fremitu et clamore*, but the reference there is to approval. Cf. rather Livy 6.4.5 *fremitus fuit aspernantium imperium*.

31.2 *nomen ... amoliuntur*. H. says that the expression does not occur elsewhere. It is in Livy 28.28.10 *amolior nomen meum*.

41.1 *ruentis fortunae*. H. quotes Silius 5.225-226 *ruente | fortuna*, which I mentioned, and Seneca, *H.O.* 602-603 *melior fortuna ruit*. Cf. also Silius 15.736-737 *fortuna ruebat | Sidonia*.

2 *dedecoris securos*. H. cites for the genitive only poets. Cf. Valerius Maximus 2.6.1; Velleius 2.109.4; Curtius 5.10.15, 9.9.8; Seneca, *Ep.* 115.18, *N.Q.* 6.1.2; Quintilian 8.3.51; Pliny, *Pan.* 71.4.

50.5 *classem Dalmatae supplevere*. H. says that this expression is not found before Tacitus. Cf. Livy 26.39.7 *suppleuerat remigio naues*.

56.1 *nube atra*. H. says that this expression does not occur in prose before Tacitus. It is in Pliny, *Nat.* 18.355.

58.1 *aeger animi studiis militum et clamoribus populi arma poscentis refouebatur*. Cf. Statius, *Theb.* 10.731 *refoue dubium*.

70.1 *Cornelium Martialem ... misit ... cum mandatis et questu quod*. H. quotes Valerium Flaccus 5.623 *questu ... Iouem testatur acerbo* and does not mention Horace, *Carm.* 1.25.16-18 *non sine questu | laeta quod pubes ... | gaudeat*.

75.2 *aemulatione inter duos*. H. gives an example of *certamen inter* and one of *bellum inter* but not Nepos, *Att.* 5.4 *inter quos tantae laudis esset aemulatio*.

83.2 *luxoriosos otio*. H. quotes Sallust, *Jug.* 95.3, but not Cicero, *Inuent.* 1.22.

Book 4

5.1 *nomine magnifico segne otium uelaret*. H. forgets Ovid, *Ep.* 5.131 *uim licet appelles et culpam nomine ueles*.

17.1 *cohortibus abire an manere mallent data potestate*. In my note quoting Vitruvius 6.8.9 I omitted accidentally other examples of an indirect question in Cicero, *Off.* 1.48 *demus necne in nostra potestate est*, *Fin.* 2.104; Livy 8.34.5, 29.5.4; Seneca, *D.* 1015.3, *Ep.* 85.12. H. does not comment on the indirect question.

44.3 *lenita ... inuidia*. H. cites Livy 5.21.15 but not Sallust, *Cat.* 22.3, or Nepos, *Dion* 6.5.

59.3 *addecere ... exemplum suum*. To my quotation of Seneca *D.* 12.19.4 add Velleius 2.84.2.

68.5 *uacordi facundia*. H. remarks that this expression is not found before Tacitus. Cf. Livy 4.49.11 *audita uox eius in contione stolidi ac prope uacors*.

Book 5

9.3 *per omnem saeuitiam ac libidinem ius regum uernili ingenio exercuit*. It is remarkable that the translators Church and Brodribb, Quinn, Fyfe, Ramsay, Moore and Wellesley all misunderstand *libidinem*. It means not 'lust' or 'immorality' but 'caprice', as Goelzer, Borst and H. perceive. Cf., for example, Sallust, *Rep.* 1.1.1 *apud indignos saepe erant quasi per libidinem data*; Cicero, *Verr.* 2.1.120 *quae libido istius in iure dicundo fuerit*, *Clu.* 60 *quis tantam libidinem iudicium ferre potuisset*; Livy 3.9.5 *non ipsos libidinem ac licentiam suam pro lege habituros*, 39.47.2 *de iure aut dicto per libidinem aut non dicto*.

10.2 *manere apud exercitus Titum ad omnes principatus noui euentus casusue utile uidebatur*. In P.G.W. Glare's *Oxford Latin Dictionary* the *ad* clause is wrongly taken to depend on *utile*. Heraeus and Goelzer had quoted Livy 23.18.8 *nec ad uarios conatus hostium aut uis ulla aut ars deerat sociis Romanorum*. Cf. also Caesar, *Gall.* 7.65.1 *ad hos omnes casus prouisa erant praesidia cohortium duarum et viginti*.

M.A.GOSLING (Natal): *By any other name.....Horace, Sermones 2.8 and Juvenal 5.*

101

LCM 11.7(Jul.1986), 101-103

In his description of Nasidienus' posh but disastrous dinner-party (*Serm.* 2.8 Horace uses no fewer than nine different ways of referring to the host. This is one of several devices employed to lend variety to the piece, and assists the liveliness of the character-delineation of this complex, half-detestable and half-pitiable man. (Niall Rudd, *The Satires of Horace*, Cambridge 1966, 222, aptly sums up: 'Nasidienus is...wholly credible as a character. But he is more than a character. He stands for a type common enough in Horace's day, a type which always appears when wealth is acquired without either education or social conscience'.)

In the opening line of the satire, and again at 75 and 84, the name Nasidienus is used. The man is introduced to us as *beatus*, ironically signalling not only his wealth, but his pretensions (Palmer ad loc. compares *Carm.* 4.9.45f. *non possidentem multa vocaveris | recte beatus*...). The scansion of *Nasidieni* in four syllables, 'probably a plebeian pronunciation' (Edward P. Morris, *Horace Satires and Epistles*, Univ. Oklahoma Press repr.1980, 244), adds to the irony by its contrast with *beatus*. It is scanned as five syllables at 75, where it stands first in the line, focussing attention on Nasidienus as he responds gratefully to Balatro's (ironical) words of comfort after the collapse of the awning, and gathers together his tattered self-esteem, and his slippers, to bustle off and recoup the situation. The guests are enjoying jokes at his expense when he returns as the harbinger of yet more impressive gastronomic delights, *mutatae frontis, ut arte/emendaturus fortunam* (84-85). Here he is apostrophized with an epic vocative which not only ties in neatly with the masterly epic parody at the beginning of the episode, when the awning collapses, but the mock solemnity of which powerfully underlines the ridicule of his self-importance.

Early in the satire, when he begins his incessant boastful commentary upon the quality and properties of the menu, Nasidienus is called *cenae pater* (7). The expression draws attention to his status as host, but here too there is a touch of irony, for the respect naturally accorded the *pater familias* is undercut by the individual's excessive pride in his position, mixed with equally excessive, slightly pathetic, eagerness to please (16ff.) - an eagerness derided by Horace and his friends (18). Later we are reminded of his being *cenae pater* by his reaction to the accident with the awning, when he is discovered weeping like a bereaved father: *Rufus posito capite, ut si | filius immaturus obisset, flere* (58-9) (Rudd, op.cit. 302 n.48). This is the only place in the satire where his *praenomen* is used, and the personal touch, almost sympathetic, adds richly to the tragi-comedy.

Only one of the guests shows any genuine sympathy for Nasidienus' plight and that is Nomentanus, his client, who has been deputed to point out all the subtleties of the exquisite fare to the important guests (25-6), and who seems to be sincere (if a little lacking in taste and sense of proportion, like his patron) in his attempt to cheer up the grief-stricken host: *ni sapiens sic Nomentanus amicum | tolleret* (60-1). In using *amicum* of Nasidienus Horace introduces a new dimension to his portrayal: the man is real and human, and can command friendship, at least from his own client, if not from his more discerning and fastidious guests. Here again subtle play is made with the contrasting emotions of friendly sympathy and fun-poking pleasure at another's misfortune, contributing to the tone of sly, private amusement of a joke shared by Horace and his friends which pervades the satire.

Cicero's illuminating distinction between Roman and Greek parties is well known: *bene maiores nostri accubitionem epularem amicorum, quia vitae coniunctionem haberet, convivium nominarunt, melius quam Graeci, qui hoc idem tum compotationem tum concenationem vocant* (*Sen.* 13.45). The intimacy and mutual respect of genuine friendship is lacking from Nasidienus' party, and the word used of it is *cena*, not *convivium*, but words cognate with *convivium* occur. Horace uses *convivium* of his friend Fundanius, whom he had wanted to invite to dinner himself, but was told that he was already at Nasidienus', while Nasidienus himself, gratefully responding to Balatro's words of comfort, which he takes at face value, calls Balatro *vir bonus...convivaeque comis* (76). Once again the joke and the irony are at Nasidienus' expense, for Balatro, *suspendens omnia naso*, has been cruelly ridiculing his host under the guise of cheering him up. He is no true *conviva*, because he

- 102 is no true *amicus*. It is in this speech of Nasidienus' (65-74) that yet another word is used to designate Nasidienus - *conuiuator* - which, since it is his failings as a host that are being mocked, carries a definite sting:

*sed conuiuatoris uti ducis ingenium res
aduersae nudare solent, celare secundae.* (73-74)

If the joke elsewhere lies in Nasidienus' failure to match up to the position of respect implied in designations like *cenae pater* and *conuiuator*, the contempt of Maecenas' circle for their host is less subtly shown in the inappropriate *parochus* (36). The word is normally used of public commissaries whose duty it was to supply lodging, fuel and food to those travelling on official business (cf. *Serm.* 1. 5.46). Here it is used to Nasidienus in the description of his reaction to Vibidius' demand for *calices maiores* (35): he turns pallid, being averse to heavy drinkers, either because they may become unruly, which would spoil the tone of his dinner, or because they will dull their palates and fail to appreciate the subtleties of his chef's masterpieces. To use *parochus* of a host here is to suggest the officious meanness of petty officialdom, as if he were disbursing rations to his guests, and is hardly complimentary.

The rest of the words used to refer to Nasidienus all relate to his position as master of the house. When he is offering a choice of wines to Maecenas, in an apparent show of politeness which Horace's exclamation *diuitias miseras!* (18) shows to be in pretentious bad taste, he is called *erus* (16), as he is again when explaining, in excessive detail, his own recipe for the sauce served with the pregnant lamprey (43). His condescending pomposity, underlined by a word which carries connotations of the superiority of the master over his slaves, is as ill-mannered as it is unsuitable, for Maecenas, whom he tries so hard to impress, is immeasurably his superior in both social standing and sophistication.

Another word used often by slaves, when mentioning their master to each other, is *ipse* (common in this sense in Plautus, and cf. Catullus 3.6-7, *suam ... ipsam*, of Lesbia as the sparrow's mistress). It refers to Nasidienus in the description of the seating arrangements (*super ipsum*, 23), and again when Fundanius concludes his description of Nasidienus' disquisition on picking apples by a waning moon with *quid hoc intersit, ab ipso audieris melius* (32-33). Here again the pomposity of Nasidienus is being shown up (note the didactic *me docuit*, 31), and the use by Fundanius of an expression frequently used by slaves to refer to 'the master' is slightly derogatory.

Finally, in the last episode of the poem, Nasidienus is called *dominus*. The word is the delayed, climactic subject of a long sentence describing the intricacies of a new dish, where once again Nasidienus has fallen into the social error of discoursing at pompous length on the *causas ... et naturas* of his *suavis res* (92-93). *dominus* should be a term of respect; but Nasidienus has abused his position as host to such an extent that his guests not only feel superior to him, but have no compunction in revenging themselves on him by fleeing, leaving the delicacies untasted, as if they were poisoned.

Horace has made use of a wide range of names and terms for Nasidienus, which highlight his pomposity, his pretentiousness, his desperate and snobbish attempts to impress. It is worthwhile comparing Juvenal's much less varied references to Virro in Satire 5. To begin with, the patron and host is not named, but he is referred to as *rex* (14), a colloquial, half-humorous expression which carries a deadly irony in the context of this particular poem and at once sets the tone of overbearing tyranny exercised by Virro throughout the meal, not merely to show his superiority to his humbler guests, but deliberately to make the latter suffer (157). *tu tibi liber homo et regis conuiua uideris* says Juvenal to Trebius (161), only to emphasize that there is no possible conviviality (in the Ciceronian sense) between a client and such a *rex* as Virro. All the other words used of Virro stress his dominance. He is called *ipse* at 30, 37-39, 86, 107, 114 and 142; and *dominus* at 49, 81, 92 and 147, each time in contrast to his less privileged guests. Once he is called *ille: ille sapit qui te sic utitur* (170). At the end, as the bitter climax of the contrast between impoverished dependant and wealthy host is reached, Juvenal tells Trebius that if he can put up with Virro's calculated cruelty for the sake of a meal, there is no limit to what he will endure - and deserve to endure: *his epulis et tali dignus amico* (174). As the final word of a satire which condemns the humiliations deliberately inflicted on his humbler guest by a patron so far removed from the ideal of earlier days, *amico* comes with savage irony.

Apart from these few nouns and pronouns, Virro is throughout referred to by name. The name is instantly repeated as Juvenal hammers home his attack on Virro (37-39, 43, 99, 128, 149, 156). He becomes synonymous with arrogant cruelty and the desire to humiliate. Unlike Nasidienus, he is not fully delineated as a character; despite the constant use of his name he stands only for a type (*Virro sibi ... et reliquis Virronibus*, 149).

It is noteworthy how often the name, and the words *ipse* and *dominus*, occur in the dative (81, 99, 107, 147, 149). Food is served to Virro: there is a constant suggestion of obsequiousness which reinforces the impression of his tyranny. With cynical amusement Juvenal imagines a reversed situation, with Trebius suddenly, miraculously, found to be wealthy and Virro treating him with exaggerated deference: *da Trebio, pone ad Trebium, uis, frater, ab ipsis ilibus?* (135-136). The reversal only serves to underline his portrayal of domineering arrogance.

Juvenal concentrates only on two related aspects of Virro's character, his tyranny and his cruelty. The portrayal is relentlessly hammered into our consciousness by the deliberate lack of variation in the words chosen for Virro, and their consequent constant repetition. The technique, typical of Juvenal, is quite different from Horace's subtle variations on a theme, with each new word precisely right for its context and implications.

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H.D.JOCELYN(Manchester): *Ennius, Annales 194-196 Vahlen*² (183-185 Skutsch)
and Richard Bentley LCM 11.7(Jul.1986), 103

*nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis
nec cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes
ferro non auro uitam cernamus utrique.*

Thus do all examined manuscripts of Cicero's *de officiis* (1.38) but one report the beginning of Pyrrhus' reply to the Roman ambassadors who sought to ransom their fellow-countrymen. Cod. Heidelberg, Universitätsbibl. Pal. lat. 1531 (13th century) replaces the third *nec* with *non*. So too Vahlen and Skutsch, although not the editors of the *de officiis*. *non* is surely right. Nevertheless problems remain.

*non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes,
ferro non auro ...*

is tautologous. Not that Ennius sought to avoid tautology: Pyrrhus' speech itself has *nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis* (194) and *dono ... doque* (201). The tautology in question is, however, a peculiarly inelegant one. Furthermore, the application of the denominative verb *cauponari* to both parties of the conflict (*utrique*) has something odd about it: the sellers of prisoners might reasonably be classed as *caupones*, not so reasonably the buyers.

On November 15th, 1715, Richard Bentley preached before the University of Cambridge a sermon upon popery (to be found now in A.Dyce, ed., *The Works of Richard Bentley, D.D.*, vol.III, *Theological Writings*, London 1838, pp.241-262. His text was chapter 2, verse 17 of Paul's second letter to the Corinthians, which the Authorised Version presented as 'For we are not as many, which corrupt the word of God: but as of sincerity, but as of God, in the sight of God speak we in Christ'. Bentley began his sermon by pointing out that the English translators used a faulty text and failed to interpret correctly the Greek phrase *καταλείοντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ*. One learnt things in church in the eighteenth century. An erudite exposition of the use of *καταλείν* governing an accusative concluded (pp.242-3) with 'So *cauponari*, in the famous passage of Ennius where Pyrrhus refuses the offered ransom for his captives, and restores 'em *gratis*:

*Nec mi aurum posco, nec mi pretium dederitis,
non cauponanti bellum, sed belligeranti.'*

The quotation of the *Annales* came no doubt from Bentley's capacious memory. His unconscious but ever critical mind may have corrected the old poet himself rather than a corrupt tradition. Nevertheless we have here an idea well worth rescuing from the theological darkness.

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'As to why they broke the treaty, I have placed first an account of the αἰτίαι ...': causes or charges? Thucydides resolves the ambiguity by the addition of '... and διαφοράι'; the recriminatory sense is confirmed a few lines later (αἰτίαι ... ἐκατέρων) and by the echo in 1.146 (αἰτίαι ... καὶ διαφοράι ... ἀμφοτέροις): note also 1.66 (αἰτίαι ... ἐς ἀλλήλους). But 'charges and disagreements' may also be causes, since they may influence a decision to go to war; and that is clearly Thucydides' meaning here: he presents the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοράι as explaining διότι the treaty was abrogated, ἐξ ὅτου the war arose.

Of course, it would be absurd to say 'I have given an account of the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοράι so that no one need ever enquire ἐξ ὅτου the war arose; but in fact the real explanation is quite different' (πρόφασις as explanation: L.Pearson, *TAPA* 103[1972], 381-94; against the 'medical' interpretation favoured by Rawlings and others see C.Schaublin, *Gnomon* 51[1979], 10-12, A.Heubeck, *Glotta* 58[1980], 232). So the statement about the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις must qualify, not cancel, the implied explanatory role of the αἰτίαι; they are genuine πρόφασις, but not the most genuine. This accords well with 1.88, where οὐ τοσοῦτον ... ὅσον adds a more cogent explanation without denying the qualified validity of the first (H.D.Westlake, *CQ* ns8[1958], 102-5). This means that we are not (*pace* G.E.M.de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* [London, Duckworth, 1972], 53-5) dealing with a contrast between real and professed (but false) πρόφασις. On the contrary, even if it is true that Sparta would not have gone to war over the αἰτίαι ἐς τὸ πᾶνερὸν λεγόμενα had they not felt threatened, they would nevertheless hardly have gone to war had they not been able to persuade themselves that it was the Athenians who were in breach of the treaty. So the αἰτίαι have genuine explanatory force.

If ἀληθεστάτη implies that this is the most genuine among many genuine πρόφασις, the antithetical ἀφανεστάτη presumably implies that it was also the least apparent among many — but still, therefore, itself in some measure apparent. This is borne out by Thucydides' account of the discussions at Sparta, in which (as has often been observed) the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is articulated, notably by the Corinthians (1.68-71). Indeed, many interpreters have felt that, by comparison with the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοράι, the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is too much in evidence in Thucydides' account to be called ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ (e.g. A.Andrewes, *CQ* ns9[1959], 225-6; de Ste Croix, 56-7; *HCT* V, 419-20). This is a mistake, as a re-examination of the text will show.

The Corinthians do attempt to aggravate Spartan fear of Athens' growing power; but do they neglect the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοράι? On the contrary, they begin by speaking of the harm they have suffered at Athenian hands (68.2 βλάπτεσθαι, ὑβριζόμενοι) and their resentment at Sparta's failure to defend them; Athenian behaviour is denounced (68.3 ἡδίκουν; note the implications of 69.6 ἐχθρῶν ἀδικησάντων, 71.1 ἦν ἀδικῶνται), and the sole question is: how are they to defend themselves against Athenian ἀδικία (69.2)? Thus they conclude with an appeal to Sparta to come to the aid of her allies (71.4-7). Even if one chooses to emphasize the allusions to the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις in the Corinthian speech, however, it would be rash to assume that the speech is meant to be taken as typical (so de Ste Croix, 59). Thucydides might have given it prominence precisely because of an untypical emphasis on the point he thought most significant. We must look at what he tells us about the other speeches in the narrative portion of his account before we draw any conclusions. The assembly is prompted by Corinthian complaints about Athenian violations of the treaty and of their ἀδικία (67.1), seconded by Aeginetan claims that the treaty had been broken (67.2); Sparta responds by inviting the allies to cite further instances of Athenian ἀδικία (67.3 εἰ τίς τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι). Various states bring charges (67.4 ἐγκλήματα); Megara, in particular, cites numerous disputes (67.4 διαφορά), and especially the Megarian decrees, which they see as a violation of the treaty (παρὰ τὰς σπονδὰς; already a cause of suspicion and an ἐγκλημα for the Corinthians, 42.2-3).

That the ἐγκλήματα constitute the main theme of the allied speeches is indicated also by the Athenian reply. They choose not to address themselves at length to the points raised in the debate; instead they defend their conduct towards their own allies (73.2 - 77) and warn the Spartans of the dangers of war (78). But when they do refer to the allied arguments, they say nothing of the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις; they speak of the ἐγκλήματα (71.3, cf. 72.1) and διαφορά (78.4), and take it for granted that these are the considerations that might move the Spartans to a declaration of war (78.1 ἐγκλήμασι πεισθέντες). In the Spartan closed session most of the speakers argue in just those terms (79.2 τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰ γινῆναι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤδη καὶ πολέμητα εἶναι ἐν τάχει). Archidamus accepts that the issue is the harm done to the allies (82.1), the allied ἐγκλήματα (82.5) and Athenian ἀδικία (85.2, mentioning Potidaea), and he does not dispute that these constitute a *casus belli*; he contests only the urgent ἐν τάχει: delay would give the Athenians an opportunity to back down, while allowing Sparta time to make the necessary preparations for war.

Of the debate's concluding — and conclusive — speech de Ste Croix comments that Sthenelaidas says nothing directly about the αἰτίαι, and in his last sentence, with the words, "And do not allow the Athenians to become greater", returns to the "truest explanation" (p.56). In fact Sthenelaidas bases his argument for war entirely on Athenian ἀδικία, on the harm that Sparta's allies have suffered at Athenian hands and on the need to defend and avenge them: οὐδαμοῦ ἀντεῖπον ὡς οὐκ ἀδικουσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους συμμάχους ... ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγέννηται (86.1); τοὺς συμμάχους, ἦν αἰχρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοριζόμεθα ἀδικουμένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δ' οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν (86.2); σύμμαχοι ἀγαθοί, οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστὶν ... βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα (86.3); ἡμῶς ἀδικουμένους ... τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀδικεῖν (86.4); μήτε τοὺς συμμάχους καταπροδιδόμεν, ἀλλὰ εὖν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιώμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικούντας (86.5). To what are these references, if not to the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοραί? When he speaks of the growth of Athenian power (86.5 μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔατε μείζους γίνεσθαι) he is surely not urging this as a reason for opening hostilities — it is common ground, as we have seen, that Athenian ἀδικία is a sufficient *casus belli* — but as a reason for opening hostilities at once (86.3 τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει, cf. 86.4). Archidamus has urged delay and claimed that this would make the Spartan war-effort more effective: Sthenelaidas counters with the claim that further delay would be to Athens' benefit (allowing her to consolidate her power) rather than to Sparta's.

Thucydides regards Spartan fears about the growth of Athenian power as the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις of the war; his own view, therefore, is rather different from that he attributes to Sthenelaidas, for whom the αἰτίαι καὶ διαφοραί are sufficient grounds for war, and the growth of Athenian power is a reason for going to war sooner rather than later. If any contradiction is at risk here, it is not that the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις is too much in evidence; it is that Thucydides' account of the debate, and in particular the perception of Spartan opinion implied by the speech assigned to Sthenelaidas (cf. 1.22.1 περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα), give no support to the claim that the Spartans made their decision οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν συμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις (1.88). This discrepancy exists, however, only if Thucydides is understood as claiming that the growth of Athenian power was a consideration which directly influenced the Spartan decision; and such is not his meaning. His view seems to be rather that the Spartans' perception of Athens as a threat created a climate of opinion in which they were predisposed to see Athenian actions as ἀδικία, and to react angrily to them as such; once a disposition to draw certain conclusions has arisen, those conclusions may be drawn without any further reference to the factor which gave rise to the disposition initially. The implication of 1.88, therefore, is: 'the Spartans were persuaded by their allies' arguments; but — and this is the more important point (sc. since it explains why they were so readily open to persuasion) — they were also afraid of the Athenians becoming more powerful'. It is the same reasoning that underlies Thucydides' claim that the πρόφασις of 1.23.6, though ἀφανιστάτη λόγῳ, is in fact ἀληθεστάτη.

106 Reviews: GILLIAN CLARK(Liverpool)

LCM 11.7(Jul.1986), 106-109

Beryl Rawson, ed., *The Family in Ancient Rome*, London & Sydney, Croom Helm, 1986.
Pp.279, cloth £18.95. ISBN 0-7099-4202-8

The editor has already commented (*Booknotes*, LCM 11.3[Mar.1986], 48) that this collection is 'almost entirely factual and not disfigured, as are so many books on this topic, by feminist dogmas'. I would have liked to be able to continue LCM's tradition of lively debate by asserting that it is, on the contrary, marred by the lack of a consistent feminist methodology: one man's fact is another woman's unconscious interpretation. But that would not be true. This is, indeed, a collection very firmly based on surviving Roman law, literature and epigraphy. The contributors vary not so much in the extent and thoroughness of their scholarship as in their willingness to offer conclusions and speculations.

At one end of the range comes P.R.C.Weaver's almost entirely factual paper on the status of children born of 'marriages' between free and slave. The epigraphic evidence shows some anomalies, which may be explained by the working of the *SC Claudianum* (for the benefit of those murmuring 'Remind me ...', the emperor Claudius provided that a free woman who wished to enter *contubernium* with a slave might do so by agreement with the slave's master, on condition that the children – contrary to the *ius gentium* – should be slaves. She herself was reduced to freedwoman status, or, if the slave's master had been kept in ignorance, was herself enslaved). Weaver's earlier discussion (*Familia Caesaris*, 1972) was greeted, he says, with 'profound silence'. It was probably the silence of stunned acquiescence – though his point about the economic, rather than moral, motive for the *SC* was widely acknowledged. What does Weaver want us to do with his facts? Is there, for instance, evidence to say that demarcation lines between slave and free were often uncertain, that slave status did not always matter, that the *SC* was unlikely to deter a free woman? Similarly with Jan Blaney's brief paper on Roman theories of conception, i.e. Lucretius and Galen: is there any evidence of their use, as by Aeschylus and Aristotle, to strengthen paternal rights over the child? Fact is sacred, but comment is essential.

At the other end of the range are W.K.Lacey on *patria potestas* and Keith Bradley on wet-nursing. Bradley establishes from the epigraphic evidence that there is no clear case of a freeborn *nutrix*, but also, surprisingly, that not all nurslings were upper-class babies with nannies. He argues, reasonably enough, that slave owners probably had strictly economic motives for providing slave babies with nurses: to get the baby's mother back to work or, if she had died, to secure her child for the household. He also advances into 'psychohistory' to suggest that the upper classes used wet-nurses precisely to prevent parental bonding and to avoid heavy emotional investment in a child whose chances of survival were not good. This point is difficult to assess, since it is not within present day middle-class experience and is not made by even the most grouchy ancient Expert (Roman mothers were beset by philosophers rather than by child psychologists, but where's the difference? Substitute 'child-minder' for 'wet-nurse' and you could reprint Favorinus tomorrow). Both economics and self-preservation, says Bradley, resulted in the exploitation of the lower-class nurse by here (usually) upper-class employers. Very likely: but, as Bradley acknowledges, some parents and some nurses clearly adored their charges. Some do and some don't, whatever the system (and the system in general use today is quite unusually parent-intensive).

Lacey's paper starts from the contrast, which he might profitably have expanded, between Roman *domus* and Athenian *oikos*. The *kyrios* of an *oikos* must transmit it to his son(s), natural or adopted, or import an heir via an *epikleros* daughter; marriages within the family, especially of uncle and niece, are favoured so that the *oikos* does not split too often; and the state and its sub-groups (demes and phratries) are anxious to keep up the number of *oikoi* contributing to funds. In Rome the *paterfamilias* has much more scope and the state is not concerned to ensure the perpetuation of the *domus*. The contrast was clearly made by J.A.Crook in his 1967 article on *patria potestas* (*CQns* 17.113-22); but whereas Crook suggested (p.114) that 'the legal character of *patria potestas* stands out in sociologically misleading clarity', Lacey (p.123) argues that '*patria potestas* was the fundamental institution underlying other Roman institutions'. Athens, for Lacey, is 'a nexus of equals linked together in groups based on kinship', Rome is a nexus of

individual *patres* and their dependants, and the Roman state is formed on the model of the family, a *domus* with a *paterfamilias* as its head. The city is the *domus*, divided from *foris* by the *pomoerium* and a symbolic *ianua*, its hearthfire tended by the ritual daughters of the *pontifex maximus* (no reference to Vernant's *Hestia-Hermès*, which is becoming next thing to an ancient source — perhaps because *Hestia* is none too easy to detect in sources earlier than Vernant). The consul, while he holds the *fascēs*, is as nearly as possible a *paterfamilias* monitored by a *consilium*. The praetor fixes a day, accepts a case and explains his judgment like a *patronus* settling the affairs of his *clientes*. Since even the consul may be a *filiusfamilias*, there is no discomfort in acknowledging that citizens are not equal in status (there is an interesting suggestion, p.134, that wills developed not so as to allow the *paterfamilias* freedom to dispose of property, but so as to provide for the inheritance of sons who had been formally emancipated in order to enjoy *ius commercii*.)

It is a tidy picture — too tidy to be convincing. What about all the other family ties? Judith Hallett's *Fathers and Daughters* (reviewed LCM 10.1[Jan.1985], 14-15) was not available to Lacey, but Crook has some valuable warnings, both in this collection and in his 1967 article, against putting too much emphasis on *agnatio*. And what about the *gens*? Athenian phratries ensured that their members knew each other, were linked by shared *hiera*, and could attest disputed cases of parentage and citizenship. Roman *tria nomina*, the mark of the citizen, point to membership of a *gens*; a woman's name points only to that. Is it enough to dismiss the *gentiles* (p.122) as 'hardly detectable in the historical period'? Would it not be worth setting the question, briefly, in its anthropological context? (A useful survey in Sally Humphrey's introduction to Fustel de Coulanges in *The Family, Women and Death* [1983], pp.139-143).

The middle way is golden. Beryl Rawson and John Crook provide papers (two each) which are admirably documented yet never lose sight of the implications for human experience (J.P.V.D.Balsdon's books, cited with some approval in the bibliography, were always notable for this virtue). Rawson offers a clear and sensible introduction, aware of recent developments in 'family studies' and usable by non-classicists (it includes the splendidly practical suggestion that Roman love poetry died because husbands became less absorbed in politics and so there was a dearth of neglected upper-class wives; Rawson, pace Griffin, thinks Rome had no class of educated *hetairai*). Her more technical paper on children in the Roman *familia*, complementing her 1966 article (*CP* 61.71-83) on slave families, sorts out the range of *alumnus*-relationships and considers whether they and *vernae* had any chance of a surrogate family life.

J.A.Crook says that his paper on *Women in Roman Succession* was only for background and makes no claims to originality, but he can scarcely help illuminating what he discusses. In particular, he notes that, in praetorian case-law, a daughter whom her father had dowered and emancipated could not inherit from his estate unless she returned her dowry to the total — that is, if she kept her dowry she was reckoned to have had her cut already. Crook suggests (p.61) that it was common practice to emancipate a daughter who married *sine manu*, just to make the point that she was not expected to inherit. Given the temptation to interpret *emancipatio* as emancipation in the modern sense, and marriage *sine manu* as escape from the heavy hand of a husband, it is refreshing to think that *emancipatio* may have no more feminist significance than opting for joint or separate taxation depending on your income level. Again, on p.63 comes the very important comment that whereas *agnatio* prevails in automatic succession, *potestas* and guardianship of the insane, in other aspects of Roman life *cognatio* and the maternal line have equal importance, manifested in surviving wills. This point is further exemplified in Suzanne Dixon's careful treatment of the finances of Cicero and Terentia.

Crook's second paper argues that the *SC Velleianum* was not a piece of first-century A.D. anti-feminist backlash. It advised the praetor not to accept actions against women who had gone surety for someone else's debt — so the creditor would presumably refuse to accept a woman as surety, and women might be severely restricted in their financial dealings. But it appears from the *Digest* that the praetor did accept such actions when the woman obviously knew what she was doing. The point was rather to protect women from being pressured into standing surety for, say, a husband's debts: they had no other protection once agnate *tutela* was abolished,

108 since non-agnate tutors could be forced into agreement.

Crook ends his first paper (p.79) with the question: how does property, in Rome or Sparta, accumulate and finish up in the hands of women. It may not be too difficult to say how it happens; if women can inherit, and the risks of childbirth are less than the risks of war and politics, and if rich fathers look for rich husbands for their daughters ... The question is rather, why didn't the Romans (or the Spartans) mind? What was their strategy of heirship? Why did Rome not have an *epikleros* system? Was the *lex Voconia*, which prevented fathers in the first census class from leaving a woman as sole heir, an attempt to avoid the *eremos oikos*, and did it fail because a daughter's welfare was more important than her father's name, or because the name would survive in agnates and *gentiles*? As Beryl Rawson says in her conclusion, there are many topics left for investigation; but this book is an excellent starting-point.

Jane F.Gardner, *Women in Roman Law and Society*, London and Sydney, Croom Helm, 1986. Pp.281, cloth, £22.50. ISBN 0-7099-1178-5

How pleasant to be able to say, 'What, another book on Roman women?'. The silent ones are making their comeback; not, of course, with their own voices, but with those of their male contemporaries interpreted by their articulate female successors. The particular merit of Jane Gardner's lucid and sensible book is to make clear the practical effect of Roman law in the lives of women: not the lives of 'Roman women', the upper-class inhabitants of the capital who for so long provided most of the material for discussion, but the lives of women who were subject to Roman law, in Rome and Italy and the provinces including Egypt, of social status ranging from those affected by the *lex Voconia* to those afflicted with *infamia* as prostitutes or treated as possessions. Gardner is very helpful on matter which, as she says (p.2), had previously to be gathered with effort from largely unreadable textbooks: here are *tutela* and its attrition; marriage, its breakdown, and the financial consequences; a woman's ability to benefit, or even to keep contact with, her children; and the precise conditions of life of textile workers and baby-minders, female slaves of reproductive age and freedwoman concubines, *inter alia*s. Much of the material has, inevitably, been discussed in other places, but it is good to have it so shrewdly analysed.

Gardner is well aware that the law does not tell us what people actually did, only what it seemed right to permit or forbid them to do, and she is restrained in commenting on the major changes in society and sentiment which underlie changes in the law. I rather regret this: she is so good on the way changes in English law, in the 19th and 20th centuries, have affected the assessment of women in antiquity (ch.12), that it seems a pity not to have more on, say, the weakening of agnate rights (p.166) in relation to changes in urban society. But speculation would no doubt blur the clarity, even if it isn't against her principles as a scholar. The section on the *lex Voconia* (pp.170ff.) nicely illustrates the character of the book. An admirably clear account of the law, and the limitations of evidence as to its purpose, is followed by doubts about the 'anti-feminist' interpretation, particularly Judith Hallett's suggestion (1984, 92ff.) that the law was designed to check the threat posed by heiresses to patriarchal control of Roman society. Hallett argues that rich women could influence the expenditure, and thereby the social position, of their families. Gardner demonstrates that women could not, in Roman law, actually control the spending of family money, though they could (with a manipulable *tutor* or none) use their wills as bribe or threat: she prefers to suggest (p.176) that the law was designed to avoid having money 'out of circulation' in the hands of women rather than active in male public life. But Gardner also makes it easy for the reader to check that a rich woman had plenty of scope for judicious loans and gifts: she could choose which family member or project to support, and if she had 'new money' in the form of *res nec mancipi* (pp.18, 175) she need not even consult a *tutor* in disposing of it. If Aunt Sempronia will pay young Tiberius' fees at the University of Athens, but will not kit him out as *tribunus militum* to a commander she has always disliked, she may well have some influence on the career of a Roman statesman, especially if the family would rather not go into

- 109 debt elsewhere (on the subject of aunts, those who have not met her may like Ausonius' Aunt Aemilia [p.240], a *virgo devota* who couldn't stand women [either?] and practised medicine: she was also called Hilaria because of her 'boyish cheerfulness' — just right for a doctor).

Gardner is particularly good on women outside the upper classes. As she says (p.258), the supposed independence of wealthy Roman women is less impressive in the 1980s than in the 1960s; and one might add that the occasional 'high achievers' are less likely to be seen as achieving or manifesting equal opportunities. She gives careful and differentiated treatment to those who had to opt for low-paid jobs as well as to those no better than they should be, *infamae* as prostitutes or entertainers or suspect as in the catering trades (a man might not marry a barmaid, p.32). It appears (p.252) that prostitutes wore the toga. *en Romanas virum dominas gentem-que togatam* ... how on earth did you wear a toga sexily? The law does afford odd sidelights. *venter* is legal Latin for the baby in Mummy's tummy; a man may subsidize *opsonia* for his wife to eat, but probably not ensure their provision to his widow, who was only entitled to the basics. Logic may be modified by human feeling; why doesn't a slave's baby count among the 'fruits' to which her mother has legal title (pp.211-213)? Why must a widow, but not a divorcee, wait ten months before remarrying (pp.50-56)? Should a freedwoman count as concubine or wife (p.57?). All such questions get informed, often entertaining, and always clear discussion. A very useful addition to the Women shelf.

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C.J.CRESSEY(Birkbeck College, London): *Two notes on Xenophon: Agesilaus 6.7 & 11.15*
LCM 11.7(Jul.1986), 109

1. *The virgin soldier, Agesilaus 6.7.*

Discussing Agesilaus' tactics on the march Xenophon employs a very curious simile, ἡσυχῶς δ', ὥπερ ἂν παρθένος ἡ σαρρνεστάτη προβαίνοι.

The mode of gait is partly flattery — Agesilaus was halt — but why παρθένος?

As a married man with a family Agesilaus was hardly celibate, not to mention his homosexuality — played down by Xenophon but see Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 2.1, 11.2, 13.4, 20.6.

Is the Athenian Xenophon inadvertently comparing the Spartan king to his own city's eponymous goddess, τῆς καλουμένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων Παρθένου (Pausanias 10.34.8), *bellica uirgo* (Ovid, *M.* 4.754)?

Another termagant is more likely: the worship of Artemis was strong in the Peloponnesus and Sparta (R.M.Dawkins, ed., *The sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta* [Supplementary Paper no.V of the Society from the Promotion of Hellenic Studies], London 1929). So the fighter is compared to the huntress, the effeminate man to the masculine goddess: but it's still a curious simile.

2. *The jaws of life, Agesilaus 11.15*

Agesilaus' obit, according to Xenophon, took place πρὸς τῷ στόματι τοῦ βίου ὧν. Compare first Pindar, *P.* 4.44, χθόνιον Ἀίδα στόμα, a conceit much liked by Latin poets, e.g.: *leti sub dentibus ipsis*, Lucretius 1.852; *malae tenebrae | Orci, quae omnia bella deuoratis*, Catullus 3.13-14; *primis in faucibus Orci*, Vergil, *A.* 6.272; *rapacis Orci*, Horace, *C.* 2.18.30 (with which cf. Callimachus, *ep.* 2.6, ὀρραιτῆς Ἀιδῆς, *AP* 7.671 (Bianor?), πάντα χάων ἀπλήστε).

Then Homer, *I.* 10.8, πτολέμοιο μέγα στόμα (also 19.313, 20.359). LSJ s.v. στόμα are hesitant as to whether there is a metaphorical meaning here, and suggest that it might be analogous to the uses of στόμα for the edge of a weapon (cf. the ubiquitous *in ore gladii* of the Vulgate), or the front ranks of an army. Certainty, in either case, seems impossible, see the examples in LSJ at III a & b; however, the latter usage brings us back to Xenophon, *Anab.* 3.4, 42-42, τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος πελταστὰς ... ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ πλαισίου. The military use of the word well suits Agesilaus — 'out front' to the last —, and as στόμα can be an exit as well as an entrance it may be more decorous that he's on the lips of life (βίον ἐκπνέων, Aeschylus, *Ag.* 1517) rather than entering the maw of all engulfing night.

It's still a curious metaphor.

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- 110 Review: CECIL H.CLOUGH(Liverpool) LCM 11.7(Jul.1986), 110-112
 Girolamo Fracastoro, *Syphilis*, edited and translated by Geoffrey Eatough (ARCA Classical and Mediaeval Texts, Papers and Monographs, 12), Liverpool, Francis Cairns, 1984. Pp.viii + 295, cloth, £17.50. ISBN 0-905205-20-0

The first English version of Fracastoro's poem *Syphilis* appeared only as recently as 1935, the work of Heneage Wynne-Finch, who paralleled it with the Latin text and provided a commentary. Five years previously the Latin text of Fracastoro's *De Contagione* — a subsequent work in prose which included expanded portions of *Syphilis* — had been printed with a parallel English translation by Wilmer Cave Wright. Appropriately the edition under review builds on both. The Latin text, that of Wynne-Finch's edition, faces Mr Geoffrey Eatough's own literal English translation, which like that of Wynne-Finch is in prose (pp.38-107). The editor's 'Introduction' (pp.1-35) sets the poem in context with essential information regarding the author and his circle, and with illustrations of the classical and contemporary sources that moulded the poem.

Fracastoro, a graduate of the medical faculty of Padua University, became a member of the College of Physicians of Verona: in consequence of his poem, 'syphilis' displaced 'morbus Gallicus' as the name for the disease with which it is associated. Understandably, therefore, *Syphilis* and *De Contagione* have long been familiar to historians of medical practice, as throwing light on the origins of syphilis, providing details on that disease's impact in Italy in the early sixteenth century, as well as information on the diagnosis and cure of that time. Dr James Johnston Abraham made a significant contribution to these very aspects in his introduction to Wynne-Finch's edition.

While Mr Eatough touches on these, he rightly stresses that his original contribution is in offering new interpretations and elucidations on 'a large number of literary, mythical, geographical and even botanical topics in the poem' (p.vii). Certainly to this end the editor provides extensive notes to the text (pp.111-199), where also word usage is considered, and where not infrequently reference is made for clarification to *De Contagione*. There is an adequate bibliography (pp.201-203), and a collection of Latin and Italian extracts from sixteenth-century testimonials in commendation of Fracastoro and his work, supported by Mr Eatough's parallel English translation (pp.204-223); these extracts originated in the appendix to Fracastoro's *Carminum*, edited by G.Comino (Padua, 2nd edn., 1739). Finally, there is a 'Word Index' (computer-generated) for 'all words with a frequency of 42 occurrences or less', though *magnus*, 53 occurrences, is also included (pp.224-295).

At the very beginning it is stated that the Latin text 'follows that of Wynne-Finch. This in turn follows the intentions of the third edition (1583) of the *Opera Omnia*' (p.vii). Guided thus one may wonder why the 1583 is preferred. Fear not. If one turns rather to Wynne-Finch it becomes clear that Mr Eatough's text is that of the poem's first printing of 1530, with two lines incorporated from the author's correction in the unique example on vellum of that printing (now in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris). The editor should have made a contribution here by giving evidence as to the authenticity of the two lines: they are consistently found in printings subsequent to that of 1530; further, in the early sixteenth century it was the author above all for whom a copy on vellum was printed, either for retention by him or for presentation to the dedicatee; and my autopsy confirms that the hand is that of Fracastoro. Wynne-Finch standardized the irrational punctuation of the first printing, and wisely this is adopted unchanged by Mr Eatough.

One has to work through the editor's 'Introduction' to find something of how 111 *Syphilis* developed. According to Mr Eatough it originated 'probably between 1510 and 1512' (p.21, and cf. p.2), and it is implied that Pope Leo X was its patron at an early stage of its evolution (p.4). By about 1523 or 1524 a rough draft was in circulation, and by the end of 1525 Pietro Bembo had a copy of the text, seemingly then in two books; probably early in 1526 Bembo sent his comments on the poem to the author (pp.4, 21). Work on the final revision is dated to 1526 (p.7). The finished *Syphilis* in three books was dedicated to Bembo (p.1), with its second book dedicated to the deceased Pope Leo X (p.4). Printing in 1530 was 'under the auspices' of G.M.Giberti, Bishop of Verona (p.5).

The fundamental evidence concerning the draft in circulation and Bembo's knowledge of the poem stems from two letters of Bembo to Fracastoro, dated 26 November 1525 and 5 January 1526, supplemented with Bembo's actual suggestions for perfecting the work. The letters are only known in the version edited for publication by Bembo, first printed in his *Lettere*, III (Venice, 1552), pp.149-154, which probably in essence are faithful to the originals sent; Bembo's comments were first printed as 'Avvertimenti di Pietro Bembo nella *Syphilis* ...', in Fracastoro, *Scritti inediti*, ed. F.Pellegrini (Verona, 1954). It is a pity that these documents were not selected for publication by the editor in place of testimonials. Moreover it needs to be said that the date of the initial composition is a speculation: work on the poem may have commenced only in the early 1520s, and the dedication to Leo X may mean nothing more than a bid for Pope Clement VII's patronage, the latter being the former's cousin.

Mr Eatough's translation is often more faithful to the Latin than is that of Wynne-Finch. For instance, *bis quinis* is rendered 'for ten days' (pp.84-5), where Wynne-Finch has 'twice every five days', and since dosage is the subject, misunderstanding is of consequence. Mr Eatough convincingly supports his reading in this case with reference in the notes to Fracastoro's *De Contagione* (p.144 line 443). Even so the English translation sometimes makes me wince: 'Don't consider it repulsive nor disgusting' (pp.82-3). While the translation is closer to the Latin than Wynne-Finch's it is less pleasurable to read and would have benefited from polishing.

The 'Introduction' includes a number of factual errors. It was not in '1512' that Bembo became a secretary to Pope Leo X (elected only in 1513) (p.4). Bembo did not live in the country (as is implied on p.4), but in Padua from 1519 until 1539, when he returned to Rome, which he had left in 1519. Bembo became official historian of Venice in 1530 (not '1529') (p.4). 'Venice was the popular cause', applied to political parties in Verona in the fifteenth century, is a misunderstanding of the source indicated in the note (p.2); the source in question (Cipolla) states with reference to 1405 specifically that the lower classes (*popolo*) of Verona revolted, being exhausted with the Venetian siege of the city, thereby causing Verona to come under Venetian control.

The Fracastoro family of Girolamo's branch was of the citizen class throughout the fifteenth century, not of the *popolo*. Verona was not 'abandoned by Venice' in May 1509 (p.3), as the Veronesi would not allow the defeated Venetian army into the city and so in effect revolted from Venice. The Emperor was Charles V (not 'VI') (p.3), and Peter Martyr was not 'the American expert' (p.12), but an Italian interested in the New World. It is implied that the population of Rome in 1494 was '85,000' (p.17); in 1526 the census returns suggest there were some 54,000 living in the city, and thirty years earlier there were probably less, prior to an increase under Pope Leo X. Moreover it is hard to believe that almost one in three of the inhabitants were prostitutes as Mr Eatough suggests.

Italian history of the sixteenth century is more of a minefield than the editor has appreciated, and exploding one more passage should carry the day.

The editor tells us, without any indication of his source, that after the League of Cambrai, signed in 1508:

'At Padua the university was closed. Fracastoro with other poets and intellectuals, Andrea Navagero and Giovanni Cotta, attached himself to Bartolomeo Alviano, an able, if over-adventurous, condottiere, the main hope of many Venetians. Alviano created a private Academy at Pordenone in Friuli, but in May 1509 was defeated in the savage battle of Agnadello and captured' (p.3). The town of Pordenone surrendered to the Venetians under Alviano on 12 April 1508, and on the 15 July it was granted in fief by the Venetian government to Alviano, see A. Benedetti, *Storia di Pordenone*, ed. D. Antonini (Pordenone, 1964), pp. 147-148, where the original documents are signalled. On 28 June Alviano was appointed 'Governatore generale' (second in command) of the Venetian army. By 23 January 1509 the Venetian Senate reported that Alviano had fortified the passes of Feltre, Belluno and Cadore; on 24 February Alviano reached Vicenza in order to devise new fortifications for that city, thereafter visiting Rovereto to do likewise; the following month he was planning forts in the province of Verona.

The University of Verona was closed only after the defeat on 14 May 1509, so that this could not have been the motive for Fracastoro going to Pordenone, when Alviano was already captured. Moreover Alviano's responsibilities from when Pordenone was granted to him until his capture gave him little time to devote himself to any Academy. It is Paolo Giovio in his *Elogia doctorum virorum* (Basel, 1561), p. 128, who mentions Alviano as having an Academy at Pordenone, where among excellent poets beside Giovanni Cotta (the subject of the particular eulogy) there were Fracastoro, Navagero and Girolamo Borgia, and Giovio appears the source from which Mr Eatough's information derives. Alviano was released by the French in 1513 shortly before his appointment by Venice on 20 May as Captain General (the supreme commander); he died on 7 October 1515 of a strangulated hernia at the siege of Brescia, so that he never had much opportunity to reside in Pordenone. From Giovio's evidence it appears possible that Fracastoro visited Pordenone briefly as Alviano's guest, and the summer of 1508 is the most likely time; that there was any Academy, in the meaningful sense of the word, seems most improbable.

Flaws of a like nature can be detected in the notes to the 'Introduction' and in the notes to the text itself. Note 6 (p. 28) refers to Bembo's *Historiae Venetae Libri XII* (Venice, 1551), f. 43^r, when more conveniently the reader could have been directed to the passage provided by the editor as extract 7 (pp. 210-211). It can be added that this printing (actually at f. 43^{r-v}) derives from the censored version of the Venetian authorities, though in this case there was no change made to Bembo's original text. In note 30 (p. 29) the reference to Roscoe, *Life of Leo X*, should read: I, 399 (not '258ff.'), and in note 47 (p. 30) the reference to B. Gamba, ed., L. da Porto, *Lettere storiche*, should read: xxvii-viii (not 'xxvf.'). Bembo was never 'Fracastoro's patron' (p. 129, lines 377, 378). One knows from experience that such slips are all too easy.

More serious is the methodology adopted, which underlines weaknesses exposed in the 'Introduction'. In note 14 (p. 29) one finds:

'On Leo's concern for syphilitics see B. Pullan, *Rich and Poor in Venice* (Oxford, 1971), 233, also 270ff.. Giberti shared the concerns of the Company of Divine Love, which was deeply involved in the care of syphilitics'.

If one pursues the references one finds the first redirects to P. Paschini, *Tre ricerche sulla storia della chiesa nel cinquecento* (Rome, 1945), pp. 34-35, and the second (if one assumes it should be 267, 270) is to be linked with what appears in the note concerning Giberti. In note 47 (p. 3), rather than the obscure reference to Gamba's preface in his edition of Da Porto one ought to have been directed to the source. This latter is Bandello's undated dedicatory letter addressed to Fracastoro, prefacing his *novella* ix, in *parte II* of his collection, see M. Bandello, *Tutte le opere*, ed. F. Flora (Verona, 1942), II, pp. 726-727. The letter is actually a literary fiction and not to be treated as an historical document, though Bandello may have met Fracastoro, cf. T. Gwynfor Griffith, *Bandello's fiction* (Oxford, 1956), p. 34.